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HORIZONTAL POLITICAL EXTERNALITIES: 




  This Article discusses the dynamics of shared political 
accountability and provides a supply- and demand-side analysis of 
disaster management. Because multiple levels of government share 
political accountability in national scale disasters, disaster 
management is subject to a collective action problem. Introducing the 
concept of horizontal political externalities, this Article explains the 
shortcomings of disaster management in terms of asymmetric political 
accountability costs for ex ante preparedness and ex post relief. In the 
presence of shared accountability, investments in prevention and relief 
by one government actor confer positive externalities upon other 
government actors by reducing the overall chance of being held 
responsible in ensuing disasters. In contrast, ex post disaster relief 
involves negative externalities when action by one agency makes other 
agencies or representatives look worse. Because positive externalities 
are undersupplied and negative externalities are oversupplied, 
political externalities distort disaster management policy. When 
political accountability is shared, no single actor bears the full brunt 
of accountability. In addition, uncertainty and finger-pointing reduce 
the total sum of political accountability. The different effects of ex 
ante and ex post disaster management on political accountability may 
shed light on events before and after Hurricane Katrina. I provide 
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suggestions for further avenues of empirical and theoretical research 
on this new positive political theory of horizontal political 
externalities and political accountability losses. 
INTRODUCTION 
Hurricane Katrina left parts of a famous American city 
uninhabitable and demoralized much of the Gulf Coast region. The 
Katrina disaster differs in many respects from the hurricanes that 
regularly visit the American Southeast. Ever since French colonist 
Jean Baptiste le Moyne de Bienville built his settlement on hurricane-
prone swampland in the middle of three huge water pools—the 
Mississippi Delta, the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Pontchartrain—
experts have viewed these geographical features as a disaster waiting 
to happen.1 Although destruction was unavoidable with a storm of 
Katrina’s size,2 the repeated warnings and anticipation of the storm 
accentuate the striking lack of emergency preparedness and raise 
doubts regarding the nation’s investments in critical infrastructure.3 
 
 1. See, e.g., Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: A Flooded City, a Chaotic Response: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 11 
(2005) (statement of Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency) (regarding Hurricane Katrina as “the worst-case scenario that everyone had always 
talked about regarding the City of New Orleans”); Mark Fischetti, The Drowning of New 
Orleans, SCI. AM., Oct. 2001, at 76, 78 (explaining that only a massive reengineering effort can 
save New Orleans from a catastrophic flood); John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, Evolving 
Danger—Experts know we face a greater threat from hurricanes than previously expected. But 
because the land is shrinking and the coastline is disappearing, scientists can’t say just how 
vulnerable we are, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 23, 2002, at J12. 
 2. “[N]o matter how much is spent and how much planning takes place, natural 
catastrophes will continue and will sometimes be unexpected.” Gary S. Becker, . . . And the 
Economics of Disaster Management, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2005, at A12. “While it may seem 
contradictory to ‘plan’ for an emergency—emergencies are by definition unplanned events—in 
fact there is considerable value in such planning.” Ken Lerner, Governmental Negligence 
Liability Exposure in Disaster Management, 23 URB. LAW. 333, 334 (1991). 
 3. See Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency: 
Hearing Before the H. Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and Response 
to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (opening statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman) 
(“Dr. Kathleen Tierney, director of the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado, 
Boulder, said on a recent radio program that government missteps along the Gulf Coast were 
‘absolutely avoidable.’ It was ‘common knowledge,’ she said, that the levees could not withstand 
more than a category 3 storm, that thousands of residents without cars would be stuck if an 
evacuation order was given, and that hesitancy in issuing mandatory evacuations would prove 
devastating.”); William L. Waugh, Jr., The Disaster That Was Katrina, NAT. HAZARDS 
OBSERVER, Nov. 2005, at 7, 7 (“When Hurricane Katrina came ashore on August 29, she ended 
decades of anticipation. There were few hazards in the United States more studied by scientists 
and engineers and there was ample warning that a strong storm could cause the city of New 
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Hurricane Katrina exposed major weaknesses in government 
emergency management, including disaster mitigation and response 
and relief procedures. Inadequate planning led to critical problems 
regarding food delivery, medical supplies, personnel, communication 
networks, and evacuation assistance. The events surrounding 
Hurricane Katrina are sad evidence of the lack of government 
investment in ex ante action, i.e., disaster preparation. This stands in 
contrast to the expenditure on ex post disaster relief. The government 
currently spends billions of dollars on relief and reconstruction,4 but it 
consistently shorted precautionary investments that would have 
reduced today’s losses at a small percentage of the costs.5 This Article 
focuses on the underlying causes of such deficiencies in national 
disaster planning. 
In this Article I model disaster preparation and relief policies in 
a public choice framework in which politicians are “sellers” of 
disaster management policies who compete for votes from voters who 
are “consumers” of such policies.6 My analysis of the supply and 
demand of disaster management predicts that disaster preparation 
will be undersupplied and ex post relief will be oversupplied.7 
 
Orleans to flood”); Josh White & Peter Whoriskey, Planning, Response Are Faulted, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 2, 2005, at A1 (“Jack Harrald, director of the Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk 
Management at George Washington University, said researchers and academics have for years 
been studying New Orleans because of its particular vulnerabilities to disaster.”). 
 4. “FEMA . . . made mission assignments totaling approximately $7.4 billion,” including 
support for the Corps of Engineers ($3.5 billion) and other elements of the Department of 
Defense ($2.2 billion), private contracts ($1.6 billion), and public assistance to states ($1.0 
billion). PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, HOMELAND SECURITY 
ROUNDTABLE, COMPENDIUM OF HURRICANE OVERSIGHT IN THE GULF STATES 3 (2005). 
 5. In addition to suboptimal investment in levees, natural barriers, and zoning regulation, 
some of the harm is due to decreased funding of emergency management. See Recovering after 
Katrina: Ensuring That FEMA Is up to the Task: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic 
Development, Public Buildings & Emergency Management of the H. Comm. on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Janice R. Kilgore, CEM, Director, 
Department of Public Safety, Escambia County, Fla.) (“State and Federal governments should 
increase funding specific to emergency management activities. In the fiscal year that just ended 
(04/05) Escambia County’s share of FEMA’s emergency management funding was only $47,222. 
This was $43.00 less than the prior year (03/04) and $82.00 less than the year before that (02/03). 
Funding levels should be increasing not decreasing if we are going to build an adequate 
emergency management response in this Country.”). 
 6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 165–66 (2003) 
(defining the reality of American democracy as a type of market for votes and services). I 
assume that, even when designing disaster management, political actors will take into account 
the electoral impact of their actions, alongside public interest considerations. 
 7. I evaluate disaster management from a cost-benefit perspective. The model of shared 
accountability could also be extended to examine the distorting effects of horizontal political 
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There is an overlap in political accountability among the 
different levels of government with regard to national disaster 
management.8 Consequently, the decision of one political actor 
affects the political standing of other actors. In particular, when 
accountability is shared among different government actors, 
investments in disaster preparation confer benefits upon other 
government actors. That is, an investment in disaster preparation by 
one actor decreases the chance that others will be held responsible 
after a disaster. I call this a positive horizontal political externality. In 
contrast, ex post relief efforts impose costs on other government 
actors. When one political actor provides ex post relief, political 
actors that do not provide relief look relatively worse. I call this a 
negative horizontal political externality. 
Because political actors lack the incentive to confer benefits on 
other actors, they will undersupply disaster preparation policies. This 
may explain the lack of investment prior to Katrina into Louisiana’s 
levee systems, zoning regulation, and emergency planning. But 
because the costs of ex post relief are imposed on other political 
actors, one may see an oversupply of ex post relief.9 In fact, this is 
what occurred after Katrina. 
Furthermore, this Article argues that shared responsibilities 
create political accountability deadweight losses. That is, shared 
responsibility and finger-pointing among political actors confuses the 
public, thereby reducing the total amount of political accountability. 
Part I examines the dynamics of shared political accountability 
and provides a supply-side analysis of disaster management. It also 
applies the concept of horizontal and vertical political externalities to 
disaster management and strategic decisionmaking among 
government actors. Part II analyzes demand-side factors in disaster 
management. This part introduces the concept of political deadweight 
losses and discusses the effect of voters’ cognitive bias on the demand 
for disaster management policies. I conclude with suggestions for 
further avenues of empirical and theoretical research. 
 
externalities using other hypothetical benchmarks for disaster management, such as 
precautionary principles and fairness or humanitarian considerations. 
 8. Political accountability refers to the degree to which a political body is held 
responsible, as reflected by the impact on its election prospects or approval ratings. 
 9. It might seem odd to speak in terms of an oversupply of relief for disasters. Excessive 
relief, however, might consist of duplicative expenditures or expenditures in which the benefits 
do not justify the costs. Also, on a comparative level, ex post expenditures may be considered 
excessive whenever they could be avoided with less costly ex ante investments. 
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I.  THE SUPPLY SIDE OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
Because various government actors share responsibilities in 
national scale disasters, there are interaction effects among 
government actors in national disaster management. The interaction 
between the different levels of government influences the supply of 
emergency preparation and ex post relief. In this Part, I examine 
these interaction effects and their impact on the supply of disaster 
management. 
A. Shared Political Accountability 
The public sees the political responsibility for national disaster 
management as shared among the different levels of government. 
This causes the decisions of one political actor to affect the political 
standing of others. In particular, the public holds one level of 
government accountable for the actions of another. In this context, 
accountability refers to the degree to which a political actor will be 
held responsible, as reflected in election results10 or approval ratings.11 
Shared political accountability is a result of both institutional and 
subjective factors. With respect to the institutional factors, the large 
scale of national disasters involves a high degree of overlap in the 
allocation of disaster management tasks across the levels of 
government. For example, state and local levels handle ex post relief 
activities, and the federal government offers assistance12 and provides 
incentives to local and state government officials to engage in optimal 
mitigation.13 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
 
 10. In the literature of political economy, political accountability is generally associated 
with elections. See generally V.O. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE (1966) (arguing 
that by basing their votes on evaluations of performance, voters provide incentives to 
incumbents to pay attention to their preferences). 
 11. Political accountability may also be measured more continuously by examining 
approval ratings. I am grateful to Matthew Adler for suggesting approval ratings as a yardstick 
to measure accountability. 
 12. An increasing number of federal programs of disaster preparedness have been adopted. 
This expanding area of regulation includes the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of U.S.C.), and the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-390, 114 
Stat. 1552 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Other federal programs include the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2000), the Earthquake Loss Reduction Act of 2001, H.R. 2762, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2001), and the Earthquake Loss Reduction Act of 2001, S.424, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001). 
 13. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 5172(b)(2) (2000) provides that “the President shall 
promulgate regulations to reduce the Federal share of assistance” if facilities have “been 
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manages disaster preparation and response programs14 in 
coordination with state and local governments.15 Although evacuation 
policies are set principally in state law and local ordinances, many 
aspects of civilian evacuation reside at the federal level.16 When the 
scale of a disaster overwhelms state and local authorities, federal 
officials are required to assist evacuation procedures,17 and must take 
the lead “on coordinating necessary decisions, support research and 
rescue efforts, and . . . provide public health, medical, and mental 
health support at casualty evacuation points and refugee shelters.”18 
Law enforcement in disaster management involves shared duties 
among the FBI, the U.S. Marshall Service (USMS), the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives.19 During Hurricane Katrina these agencies 
 
damaged, on more than one occasion within the preceding 10-year period, by the same type of 
event; and . . . the owner . . . has failed to implement appropriate mitigation measures to address 
the hazard that caused the damage to the facility.”). Such division of incentives adds to the 
complex web of fragmented political responsibilities with regard to disaster management 
 14. Exec. Order No. 12,148, 3 C.F.R. 412 (1979). 
 15. In 1995, for example, FEMA introduced a National Mitigation Strategy, which 
attempted to reduce exposure to disasters in a partnership between all levels of government and 
the private sector. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, MULTI-HAZARD 
IDENTIFICATION RISK ASSESSMENT xxii (1997). Other projects, such as the Impact Program, 
measured communities’ level of disaster resistance. See Disaster Research Ctr., Disaster 
Resistant Communities Initiative: Process Evaluation of FEMA’s Project Impact, 
http://www.udel.edu/DRC/drci.html (lasted visited Sept. 3, 2006) (“In 1997, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency began the pilot stage of Project Impact, a program designed to 
encourage local communities to step up their efforts to contain future disaster losses. The goals 
of the program are to mobilize resources, stimulate the development of partnerships, spur 
mitigation activities, and enable communities to cope more effectively when disasters occur, so 
as to reduce long-term losses.”). 
 16. See generally KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DISASTER EVACUATION AND 
DISPLACEMENT POLICY: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/RS22235.pdf (elaborating the powers and roles of local governments in evacuations). For 
instance, federal statutes authorize agency heads to apply federal resources to assist disaster 
evacuations. Section 403 of the Disaster Relief and Emergency Amendments of 1988 provide 
that the president may direct the secretary of defense to apply resources to perform “emergency 
work which is made necessary by such incident and which is essential for the preservation of life 
and property.” 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c)(1) (2000). “[F]ederal policy defers to the states to enact 
laws pertinent to evacuation [measures], and local officials . . . work with state officials to 
enforce [these] laws.” BEA, supra, at 2. 
 17. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 8 (2004). The 
National Response Plan (NPR) vests the responsibility for the displacement, the provision of 
shelter, and the provision of resources to areas of displacement in both FEMA and the 
American Red Cross. Id. at 11. 
 18. Id. at 2–3. 
 19. On September 2, 2005, the attorney general called upon “[t]he FBI . . . to deploy special 
agents . . . and tactical [and communication] assets . . . ; [t]he DEA . . . to deploy Mobile 
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performed alongside state and local authorities, such as local police 
officials.20 This brief description of the shared duties of federal, state 
and local governments illustrates how no single layer of government 
has unilateral control over the response to disasters.21 In this setting of 
entangled responsibilities, politicians may realize that their actions 
will impact each other’s accountability in the market for votes. 
Second, accountability also depends on the public’s perception of 
shared responsibility. As illustrated above, disaster management 
involves a high degree of overlapping duties across different levels of 
government. This increases the public’s perception that political 
responsibility for disaster management cuts across all levels of 
government. But the public’s perception may also be unrelated to this 
formal assignment of duties. For example, even though certain relief 
activities may reside exclusively with the local government, 
shortcomings in relief efforts during a natural disaster may negatively 
affect the approval ratings of other levels of government if the public 
believes that the president, the federal government, or the governor 
are always responsible during national disasters or, alternatively, if 
the public holds a mistaken belief that different levels of government 
share responsibilities in such relief efforts. 
Shared political accountability creates a common pool problem. 
The supply of emergency preparedness in these areas requires 
coordination among the various levels of government. The different 
levels of government must successfully coordinate their efforts; 
 
Enforcement Teams, special agents, and . . . helicopters and aircraft . . . ; [t]he ATF to establish 
a Violent Crime Impact Team (VCIT) . . . ; and [t]he USMS . . . to deploy Deputy U.S. Marshals 
to conduct prisoner transport operations and . . . additional court security” services. Hurricane 
Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Government Affairs, 109th Cong. 2–3 (2006) (statement of 
Kenneth W. Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Office, FBI), available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/020606Kaiser.pdf. Although limited to special circumstances, even 
the FBI assumes certain duties pertaining to the unique law enforcement needs that might arise 
as a result of natural disasters. 
 20. The National Incident Management System (NIMS), a federal program with mutual aid 
features that provides local agencies with federal resources, emphasizes mutual cooperation as 
an essential component of law enforcement in emergencies. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MUTUAL AID: MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR MEETING 
REGIONAL THREATS, at xiii (2005). 
 21. See Richard A. Falkenrath, Senior Fellow, Brookings Inst., Panel Discussion at the 
Brookings Institution: Hurricane Katrina: Where Do We Go From Here? (Sept. 8, 2005) 
(transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20050908.pdf) (“[O]ur response 
as a nation is highly interdependent . . . . [I]f one layer of government or one agency within one 
layer of government gets [things] catastrophically wrong, the entire response will be 
handicapped as a result of that.”). 
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otherwise, there may be too much or too little supply of disaster 
management policies.22 For example, when a public policy is 
politically attractive—that is, it is expected to generate additional 
votes in an upcoming election or lead to higher approval ratings for 
an incumbent politician—a single government decisionmaker will 
adopt the program. In contrast, when two government actors compete 
for the supply of politically attractive programs, “it is in the interest of 
both suppliers to seek to gain the votes in implementing the program 
first.”23 Because political suppliers are at risk of losing votes to each 
other, they each attempt to obtain the political gain first. Even when 
one assumes that politicians are principally concerned with 
maximizing social welfare,24 the competitive nature of the electoral 
process might undermine the optimal provision of public goods and 
services. That is, if political suppliers consider merely the electoral 
costs and benefits of their policy decisions, each level of government 
will try to outbid the other in an attempt to “pre-empt the political 
field”25 and attain the highest amount of approval. Because politicians 
do not consider the impact of their policies on other levels of 
government, they will not take account of the direct and indirect 
external effects created by their decisions. This is the basic premise of 
political externalities on the decisionmaking of political actors. 
B. Horizontal and Vertical Political Externalities 
The term “political externalities” has been used on a few 
occasions in the literature to describe situations in which the political 
process allows some individuals to obtain the benefit of an activity 
without being “forced to bear the full cost of the activity.”26 In public 
choice theory, it has been used mostly to refer to “the ability of some 
groups to use the power of government to transfer benefits to 
 
 22. Common pool dilemmas engender social waste when actors do not fully internalize the 
cost of their activities. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243–48 
(1968). This may result in a race to capture. For example, government actors might spend 
money whenever they think they can reap political benefits. If each government actor decides in 
this manner, duplicate expenditures may result. 
 23. Jean-Luc Migué, Public Choice in a Federal System, 90 PUB. CHOICE 235, 239 (1997). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 241. 
 26. Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 
53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 318 (2002). 
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themselves without being forced to pay compensation to the losers.”27 
In the context of federalism it refers to situations “in which state 
legislatures are able to provide benefits to local interests by imposing 
costs on politically disorganized individuals who do not reside within 
the state.”28 More often, it has been used simply to refer to political 
decisions that impose external costs on other jurisdictions.29 In this 
situation, “political” externalities amount to negative or positive 
externalities imposed by citizens upon each other through the 
political process. 
I propose here to extend the application of the term political 
externalities to externalities that apply not merely vertically, in which 
some constituents obtain benefits at the expense of other 
constituents, but also horizontally, i.e., among different political 
actors and levels of government. Horizontal political externalities 
arise whenever political decisions impact the electoral outcome or 
approval ratings of other political actors or levels of government that 
were not involved in the decisionmaking. In this sense horizontal 
externalities are truly “political” externalities: the third-party costs 
relate to political effects as measured by election prospects or 
approval ratings. 
One can further distinguish between positive and negative 
horizontal political externalities. Political action may have a positive 
effect on the electoral chances or approval ratings of other levels of 
government. For example, when there is an overlap in duties 
 
 27. Id. at 320; see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 89 (1962) (“The 
member of the dissident minority suffers external effects of collective decisions enforced on 
him . . . .”); James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: 
Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139, 141–42 (1975) (stating that firms seek 
economic regulation in order to obtain above-market rate returns); Todd J. Zywicki, 
Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental 
Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 856–74 (1999) (arguing that many environmental 
regulations can be explained by the rent-seeking behavior of environmental interest groups that 
use the coercive power of government to pursue utility and wealth at the expense of other 
individuals to subsidize these preferences). 
 28. Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 
WIS. L. REV. 467, 471 (explaining the disposition of state legislators towards state antitakeover 
laws). 
 29. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International 
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2054 (1993) (“[N]ations will often fail to adopt 
appropriate environmental standards because of a political externality; the costs of more 
stringent standards will be borne by the nation adopting them, whereas a significant portion of 
the benefits will go to those in other countries.”). 
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regarding public health issues such as obesity, a federal program that 
successfully tackles this issue may have a positive effect on the 
standing of other levels of government that have shared 
responsibilities in this area. If there is an overlap of responsibilities, a 
successful federal program that reduces obesity will decrease the 
political liability on this issue for local and state government actors. 
Because other levels of government are able to free ride on obesity 
management, this may free up budgetary means for politically 
rewarding expenditures on other issues. Also, as an indirect effect of 
the federal program, public attention might be drawn away from 
other (related) public health issues. In other cases, policies 
implemented by one level of government may have a negative effect 
on the political standing of other levels of government. For example, 
political actors who share responsibility may appear inactive by 
comparison. 
Thus, public perceptions of responsibility may create 
interdependency between different governmental actors with respect 
to approval ratings and electoral payoffs. Such interdependency may 
lead to strategic decisionmaking among the various levels of 
government. As I contend next, horizontal political externalities may 
provide some explanation for the contrast between political inertia 
regarding preparation before a disaster, on the one hand, and the 
abundance of relief after a disaster, on the other hand.30 
C. The Supply Effect of Horizontal Externalities on Disaster 
Management 
Each level of government has two general options with regard to 
disaster management: (1) preparation and mitigation policies 
implemented prior to a disaster, and (2) relief policies implemented 
after a disaster. Politicians concerned with approval ratings and 
reelection prospects will consider the political implications of these 
general options. This may affect policies in disaster management in a 
number of ways. 
The political rewards from ex ante and ex post disaster 
management policies are very different. First, the electoral impact of 
expenditures in ex post disaster management is higher than the 
electoral benefit of investing in ex ante disaster preparation. 
 
 30. Note that such disaster relief will be relatively ineffective when prior investments in 
preparedness have not been made. 
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Investments in ex ante preparation reduce the risk and magnitude of 
damage from disasters. But the results are relatively more uncertain 
and less tangible than expenditures in ex post relief. Sending in 
troops, personnel, and food and medical supplies is highly visible and 
susceptible to media coverage. In contrast, successful efforts at 
preventing harm and increasing preparedness do not attract a great 
deal of media attention. For example, a local municipality’s stringent 
enforcement of building codes will receive less attention than the ex 
post rescue efforts after a building collapse, even though preventing 
code violations may save more lives.31 Second, political actors 
immediately capture the political rewards from ex post relief, whereas 
political rewards from ex ante preparation may only materialize 
outside the electoral time horizon of a politician. Because politicians 
are concerned with getting reelected, they have limited time horizons, 
leading them to “prefer policies that yield tangible benefits for 
constituents in the near term.”32 
Also, ex post relief is more likely to confer negative externalities 
on other levels of government. This will likely induce high levels of ex 
post relief efforts by the federal government and state governments. 
For example, Texas sent troops and medical personnel to the Gulf 
Coast region after Katrina made landfall, and this affected the costs 
and benefits of participating in the relief effort for other states like 
Florida. Representatives in Texas and Florida were probably aware of 
voters’ sensitivity about natural disasters and the government 
response to such events, because both regions are disaster-prone. 
When Texas sent troops and supplies, this probably put pressure on 
Florida to do the same to avoid appearing disinterested to voters. 
Consequently, Florida immediately sent in teams of doctors and 
nurses as well as $40 million in relief aid.33 San Antonio offered 
temporary housing to twenty-five thousand evacuees,34 and Texas 
governor Rick Perry quickly responded by coordinating relief efforts 
with other states and promised schooling for displaced children.35 
 
 31. Such a policy will be more efficient, for example, if it reduces an equal number of 
potential victims at a lower cost. 
 32. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE 137 (2004). 
 33. Special Report: When Government Fails—Katrina’s Aftermath, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 
2005, at 25, 27. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Louisiana Seeks Schools for Displaced Students, CNN.COM, Sept. 1, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/EDUCATION/09/01/katrina.schools/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 
2006). 
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Arkansas welcomed seventy thousand refugees by opening National 
Guard armories and churches. Wisconsin and Minnesota offered 
housing to thousand of refugees. 
The federal government also participated in the race to provide 
relief. More than sixteen thousand federal personnel were deployed 
to help state and local officials along the Gulf Coast recover from the 
damage.36 The National Guard deployed over forty-five thousand 
troops to Louisiana and Mississippi two weeks after Katrina’s 
landfall.37 Federal support to state and local officials and volunteer 
organizations enabled relief activities and assisted with law 
enforcement operations in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. As of 
February 2006, $88 billion in federal aid had been allocated for relief, 
recovery, and rebuilding, with another $20 billion requested to help 
victims of the storm and to rebuild the region.38 But the federal 
government and state governments consistently shorted 
precautionary investments that would have reduced losses at a small 
percentage of the costs. 
Because ex post disaster relief has the potential for high political 
reward, one would expect politicians to be interested in increasing its 
effectiveness through advance planning. Such investments could 
improve many aspects of ex post disaster relief such as evacuation 
measures, the delivery of supplies, and the continued operation of 
communication networks. Also, relief efforts may be perceived as 
more effective, thereby leading to greater political reward. So why do 
governments fail to plan in advance? First, the political benefits of ex 
ante preparation policies are not immediate and may accrue beyond 
the time horizons of many politicians. 
Second, there is an indivisibility and common pool problem. 
Because major disaster management planning necessarily involves 
various levels of government, the political benefits of such planning 
are automatically shared with other levels of government, that is, 
investing in planning confers positive externalities on other levels of 
 
 36. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: A Commitment to Continued Recovery and 
Rebuilding in the Gulf Coast (Dec. 21, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2005/12/20051221-10.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2006). 
 37. Mark Sappenfield, Katrina Poses Key Test for Stretched National Guard, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 2, 2005, at 2. 
 38. OFFICE OF THE FED. COORDINATOR FOR GULF COAST REBUILDING, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., PROGRESS MADE: A 6-MONTH UPDATE ON HURRICANE RELIEF, 
RECOVERY AND REBUILDING 1 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/ 
GulfCoast_Katrina6-monthFactSheet2-2806.pdf. 
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government. These positive externalities reduce the potential political 
liability that other political actors face. Accordingly, political actors 
will free ride on the efforts of their peers who do engage in 
preparation and planning. The result is an undersupply of disaster 
preparation and mitigation policies. 
Shared political accountability in the disaster management 
context brings to mind a well-known proposition in social psychology 
regarding the debilitating effect of diffused responsibility in collective 
action settings. When members of a group perceive that their 
obligation to act is shared with other members of the group, 
individual responsibility is diluted.39 Shared responsibilities lead to 
lower individual responsibilities, which lower the total sum of 
responsibility. Similar phenomena may explain the undersupply of 
disaster preparation and mitigation policies. Even discounting 
hindsight bias, it is now well documented that virtually all levels of 
government have underinvested in precautions for a major hurricane 
in the Gulf Coast region. Despite repeated warnings40 and 
recommendations,41 there was a lack of investment in levee 
construction, weak enforcement of building codes, inadequate 
evacuation planning, insufficient shelter, a shortage of supplies, poor 
 
 39. See generally Bernard Guerin, Social Behaviors as Determined by Different 
Arrangements of Social Consequences: Diffusion of Responsibility Effect with Competition, 143 
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 313 (2003); Bibb Latané & John M. Darley, Group Inhibition of Bystander 
Intervention in Emergencies, 10 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 215 (1968); Daniel M. 
Wegner & Donna Schaefer, The Concentration of Responsibility: An Objective Self-Awareness 
Analysis of Group Size Effects in Helping Situations, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 147 
(1978). 
 40. Experts had warned about the catastrophic likelihood of the passage of a major 
hurricane through Louisiana. The risk of a major hurricane striking and flooding New Orleans 
had been covered in issues of Scientific American and National Geographic in 2001 and 2004 
respectively, and featured prominently in a specialized literature on disaster emergency 
planning. See Shirley Laska, What if Hurricane Ivan Had Not Missed New Orleans?, 29 NAT. 
HAZARDS OBSERVER 5, 5–6 (2004). 
 41. After Hurricane Andrew in 1992, a Grand Jury Report of Dade County conducted an 
in-depth analysis of many of the disaster management failures that surfaced again after that 
storm. See generally Stephen T. Maher, Emergency Decisionmaking During the State of Florida’s 
Response to Hurricane Andrew, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1009 (1993). Similarly, Florida’s Disaster 
Planning and Response Review Committee recommended constructing better shelters in 
threatened areas and improving the accessibility of communication networks before and after 
disasters to better plan increased-capacity evacuation routes for handling mass exodus traffic 
out of city areas. SPEAKER’S TASK FORCE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, FLA. HOUSE OF 
REPS., FINAL REPORT 6 (1990). 
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cooperation and communication between different levels of 
government, and the list goes on.42 
Shared accountability leads politicians to impose external costs 
on one another. Furthermore, it leads to inferior policymaking, which 
imposes costs on citizens: “Governments’ actions . . . impact . . . most 
citizens by the very fact of being taken.”43 For this reason, 
government decisions “take on characteristics of public, non-divisible 
goods.”44 Thus, there are two aspects to horizontal political 
externalities: political actors impose costs on other political actors, 
and in so doing political actors impose costs on citizens through 
inferior policymaking.45 
D. Political Markets and Political Transaction Costs 
If shared political accountability and political externalities 
misalign policymaking and voter preferences, what can voters do to 
avoid the costs imposed by the undersupply of disaster preparation? 
Voters have two options. In terms of the famous model of Albert 
Hirschman,46 they can either exit or use their voice, that is, leave 
political districts that have poor disaster preparation (exit), or not 
vote for the politician that failed to adopt sound disaster management 
policies (voice).47 
Voters can withdraw support from local governments by 
relocating out of political jurisdictions that fail to satisfy voter 
preferences.48 The availability of the escape option is limited by the 
 
 42. Many, if not all, of the these observations can be found in H.R. REP. NO. 109-377 and 
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED, infra note 57, at 51–
64. 
 43. Migué, supra note 23, at 248. 
 44. Id. 
 45. This is where horizontal and vertical political externalities connect. Because of their 
effect on policy, horizontal political externalities impose external costs on citizens. 
 46. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
 47. Id. at 4. Of course this option is limited when incumbents are in their last term of office. 
But see Gary Becker & George Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of 
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–11 (1974) (providing suggestions to solve the last-period 
problem for incumbents who are not running for office again, such as the threat of losing 
pension in case of misbehavior in their last term). 
 48. See, e.g., Dennis C. Mueller, Buchanan, James McGill, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 181, 183 (Peter Newman ed., 1988) (“Tiebout’s 
famous demonstration . . . that free mobility of individuals across local communities can 
produce a Pareto-optimal allocation of local public goods is a classic argument for a 
decentralized, federalist government . . . .”). 
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fact that transaction costs are larger in political than in private 
markets. “[T]he mobility exit is far from costless,”49 and in any case is 
unavailable when political externalities are widespread. Voters also 
have the periodic opportunity to make themselves heard in the voting 
booth. Horizontal political externalities open the door to opposing 
politicians, outsiders, and antipolitical sentiments. Thus, one would 
expect politicians to improve their policymaking by taking 
externalities into account. But will politicians remove political 
externalities? Not necessarily. 
Horizontal externalities are caused by uncoordinated, self-
interested behavior of political suppliers who compete in a market for 
votes. To overcome horizontal externalities, therefore, some 
cooperation among politicians is necessary. The issue is whether 
politicians can overcome collective inaction through voluntary 
bargaining. The answer to this question depends on the transaction 
costs of political markets. 
Obviously, political transaction costs increase with the number of 
political bodies that share political duties. Political transaction costs 
will also be higher when party affiliations vary more across different 
levels of government. For example, a Democratic governor may face 
pressure from his party to refrain from bipartisan policies that would 
confer benefits on a Republican mayor or a Republican White House. 
This pressure may be particularly acute when elections are near and 
party loyalty requires partisan support for challengers on these levels 
of government. In some sense, calls for bipartisan efforts in disaster 
management are aimed at reducing the strategic considerations that 
are part of the political transaction costs that enable horizontal 
political externalities. 
More fundamentally, transaction costs and the likely success of 
coordination between political actors will be different for positive and 
negative political externalities. With regard to positive externalities, 
political actors need to overcome the individual incentive to sit back 
and free ride on the efforts of other levels of government. Due to the 
balance of power and the lack of hierarchy between different levels of 
government, such coordination will not be easy. Removing negative 
externalities may be even more difficult. First, negative horizontal 
political externalities are a zero-sum game to political competitors. 
One politician’s gain in electoral support or approval ratings is 
 
 49. Id. 
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another politician’s loss. This may diminish the potential bargaining 
range. 
Second, the pressure on politicians to remove negative 
externalities might be lower than with positive externalities. This is 
because the result of negative externalities is excessive disaster relief, 
and the tragedy that follows a disaster will quiet most criticisms about 
these excessive relief efforts. Even though such efforts might be 
considered wasteful, they are insulated by the appearance of good 
intentions and humanitarian concerns. In contrast, the result of 
positive externalities is underinvestment in disaster preparation. 
There is more pressure to remove these externalities because 
underinvestment is often associated with neglect or disinterest. 
Regardless, because negative horizontal externalities are politically 
less costly, it is unlikely that politicians will overcome the collective 
action problem independently. 
II.  THE DEMAND SIDE OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
To this point, I have focused exclusively on supply-side factors to 
explain failures in disaster management. Here, I discuss the effect of 
demand-side factors. Political actors seeking reelection are driven by 
voter preferences or the actors’ perceptions of those preferences. This 
Part first argues that political markets fail to fully discipline 
politicians because shared accountability reduces the overall sum of 
accountability. Then it discusses the effect of voters’ cognitive bias on 
the demand for disaster management policies. 
A. Political Accountability Deadweight Losses 
Part I considered the effect that shared political responsibility 
has on the supply of disaster management policies. In that discussion, 
I assumed that the voters’ demand for such policies is strong and 
constant. But shared accountability may affect not only the supply of 
disaster management policies, it may also affect the demand for 
disaster management by reducing the degree to which politicians are 
held responsible. 
As stated earlier,50 political accountability is highly subjective. It 
is difficult for the public to observe and assign specific responsibilities 
for government failings. This provides an opportunity for strategic 
 
 50. See supra Part I.A. 
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action among political actors. Take, for instance, the blame game that 
ensued once the failure of the relief effort and the lack of preparation 
became apparent. The confusion and uncertainty created by the many 
accusations made in the media by various political actors may 
ultimately reduce the total sum of political accountability. Hence, the 
blame game might be a profitable strategy for individual politicians 
and politicians as a group. 
Although they repeatedly expressed their distaste for finger-
pointing in public statements,51 federal, state, and local actors shifted 
blame to each other as the shortcomings of the relief efforts became 
apparent. According to some media sources, the White House waged 
an organized campaign to direct focus on state and local 
responsibilities.52 The Director of Homeland Security directed 
attention to state and local failures, speaking in terms of a “cascading 
series of breakdowns.”53 Most famous perhaps is Karl Rove’s 
statement that “[t]he only mistake we made with Katrina was not 
overriding the local government . . . .”54 Representative Tom DeLay, 
then Republican House majority leader, characterized the Katrina 
 
 51. President Bush repeatedly told reporters that he had no interest in “play[ing] the blame 
game.” See Fred Goldstein, Drowning New Orleans, WORKERS WORLD, Sept. 15, 2005, 
http://www.workers.org/2005/us/putrid-waters-0915 (“President George W. Bush, flanked by his 
cabinet, deflected media questions about the slowness of the federal government’s response to 
the hurricane disaster by declaring that he did not want to ‘play the blame game.’”). 
 52. See Adam Nagourney & Anne E. Kornblut, White House Enacts a Plan to Ease 
Political Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A14 (“Under the command of President Bush’s 
two senior political advisers, the White House rolled out a plan this weekend to contain the 
political damage from the administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina . . . . It began late last 
week after Congressional Republicans called White House officials to register alarm about what 
they saw as a feeble response by Mr. Bush to the hurricane . . . . The administration is also 
working to shift the blame away from the White House and toward officials of New Orleans and 
Louisiana who, as it happens, are Democrats.”); Jim VandeHei, Officials Deal With Political 
Fallout by Pointing Fingers, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A17 (“In public statements and even 
more bluntly behind the scenes, Bush administration officials have questioned local efforts to 
rescue thousands of people who were stranded for days without food, water and shelter, 
resulting in [the] death of an unknown number of Americans.”). 
 53. Scott Shane, After Failures, Government Officials Play Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
5, 2005, at A1; see also Statement by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff on Meet 
the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 4, 2005) (transcript on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (“My understanding is, and again this is something that’s going to go back—we’re 
going to go back over after the fact is, the plan that the New Orleans officials and the state 
officials put together called for the Superdome to be the refuge of last resort.”). 
 54. Rove Off the Record on Katrina, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 17, 2005, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2005/09/17/rove-off-the-record-on-ka_n_7513.html (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2006). 
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response as a state and local problem.55 A House report blamed local 
police departments for lack of effectiveness and faulted the governor 
of Louisiana and the New Orleans mayor for delaying the order for 
mandatory evacuation56 A White House report blamed Gulf Coast 
officials for not adequately anticipating massive evacuations.57 State 
officials also turned against the local government, holding New 
Orleans accountable for implementing an inadequate local 
emergency plan and for overestimating its level of preparedness.58 
Local officials returned the favor, impressing upon the media the 
failures of the federal government to set the right priorities59 and its 
delayed response to cries for help.60 Similarly, state officials blamed 
the federal government for not funding fortifications to the New 
Orleans levees and for failing to send troops, supplies, and other 
assistance quickly enough.61 Local62 and state63 officials blamed FEMA 
 
 55. See Newsnight with Aaron Brown (CNN television broadcast Sept. 6, 2005) (transcript 
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/06/asb.02.html (last visited Sept. 
20, 2006)) (“[I]t’s the local officials trying to handle the problem. When they can’t handle the 
problem, they go to the state. And the state does what they can do. And if they need assistance 
from FEMA and the federal government, they ask for it. And it’s delivered.”). 
 56. H.R. REP. NO 109-377, at 108 (2006). For a summary of the extensive House Report, 
see generally Julia Malone, Katrina Verdict: Plenty of Blame, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 24, 
2006, at A3. 
 57. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 37 (2006), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2006). 
 58. Susan B. Glasser & Josh White, Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top, WASH. POST, Sept. 
4, 2005, at A1 (“Other federal and state officials pointed to Louisiana’s failure to measure up to 
national disaster response standards, noting that the federal plan advises state and local 
emergency managers not to expect federal aid for 72 to 96 hours, and base their own 
preparedness efforts on the need to be self-sufficient for at least that period. ‘Fundamentally the 
first breakdown occurred at the local level,’ said one state official who works with FEMA. ‘Did 
the city have the situational awareness of what was going on within its borders? The answer was 
no.’”). 
 59. See Waugh, supra note 3. 
 60. Mira Oberman & Patrick Moser, Troops, Aid Finally Reach New Orleans, IAFRICA, 
Sept. 3, 2005, http://iafrica.com/news/worldnews/479881.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (“‘It’s 
too doggone late!’ Nagin said in an angry and emotional interview aired on CNN.”). 
 61. See VandeHei, supra note 52 (“Louisiana officials pushed back hard against the White 
House yesterday, sharply criticizing President Bush for offering a tentative and insufficient 
response to the obliteration of New Orleans and then trying to shift the blame to the state and 
local governments.”). 
 62. For instance, Jefferson Parish Emergency Management Director Maestri told the 
Washington Post that city officials had forwarded a list of needs after the storm, but the federal 
government was largely unresponsive. See Susan B. Glasser & Michael Grunwald, The Steady 
Buildup to a City’s Chaos, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2005, at A1 (“[W]e sat here for five days 
waiting. Nothing!”); see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Democrats and Others Criticize White House’s 
Response to Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A1 (“‘This is a national disgrace. FEMA has 
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for the slow response in the days following Hurricane Katrina.64 
Similarly, several Democrats accused FEMA of not responding 
adequately to the emergency conditions in the Gulf Coast.65 
In the weeks after Hurricane Katrina a CNN/USA Today/Gallup 
poll reported that only 13 percent of respondents held President Bush 
responsible for the failed relief efforts in the first days after Hurricane 
Katrina made landfall.66 This low number may suggest that overall 
accountability is well below full accountability.67 Would accountability 
add up to 100 percent if the survey had polled respondents on the 
relative responsibility of each political actor involved? 
I submit that shared political accountability reduces the total sum 
of political accountability, i.e., creates “political accountability 
deadweight losses.” When political responsibilities are shared, there is 
uncertainty about which political actor is responsible. The uncertainty 
is exacerbated when politicians point fingers. It is this uncertainty that 
creates political accountability deadweight losses, on which 
government actors can then capitalize. 
I conducted a preliminary test of my argument in a survey. 
Participants were asked to read a scenario that described how some 
 
been here three days, yet there is no command and control. We can send massive amounts of 
aid to tsunami victims, but we can’t bail out the city of New Orleans?’” (quoting Terry Ebbert, 
head of the New Orleans emergency operations)). 
 63. See Michelle Millhollon, Blanco Says Feds Pledged Buses, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), 
Sept. 18, 2005, at A1. (“[W]ith the FEMA buses still not in sight, [Governor Kathleen] Blanco 
called the White House . . . .”). 
 64. Much of this initial criticism was supported in the House report. See Spencer S. Hsu, 
Katrina Report Spreads Blame, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2006 at A1 (“A draft of the report . . . 
includes 90 findings of failures at all levels of government . . . .”). 
 65. See, e.g., Hope Yen, Associated Press, Audits Show Millions in Katrina Aid Wasted, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 14, 2006, at A1 (“‘Once again, FEMA failed to adequately plan for 
the very type of disaster that occurs virtually every year,’ said Susan Collins, R-Maine . . . . 
Joseph Lieberman . . . said hurricane victims and taxpayers alike are being ‘ripped off.’ ‘It’s 
unacceptable and ultimately infuriating. We need to do everything we can to insist that FEMA 
and DHS prepare for the next disaster . . . .’”); News Release, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina (Sept. 27, 2005), available at http://Katrina.house.gov/press_releases/ 
release_09_27_05.doc (calling Michael Brown “‘the government official most responsible for the 
inadequate response,’” and urging the committee to “‘call him . . . without delay’” (quoting Rep. 
Henry Waxman)). 
 66. Poll: Most Americans Believe New Orleans Will Never Recover, CNN.COM, Sept. 8, 
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/07/katrina.poll (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). 
 67. On the racial divide in the poll results, see generally Susan Page & Maria Puente, Views 
of Whites, Blacks Differ Starkly on Disaster, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2005, at 1A, and Reactions 
to Katrina Split on Racial Lines, CNN.COM, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/ US/09/12/ 
katrina.race.poll (last visited Sept. 17, 2006). 
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cities in Belgium were struck by a flood. An external commission was 
called to verify the damage, examine the cause of the flooding, and 
determine which government actors were responsible. Participants 
were randomly divided into two separate groups.68 Group A received 
a scenario in which the external commission found that three 
different government departments were responsible for the three 
different causes of the flooding. Group B was told that only one 
government department was responsible for all three causes of the 
flooding. My hypothesis was that the total accountability assigned by 
Group B would be higher than that assigned by Group A. In other 
words, when only one government agency is responsible, the overall 
accountability would be higher relative to scenarios in which three 
agencies were responsible. Some amount of political accountability is 
lost when responsibility is divided. The results confirm this 
hypothesis. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted 
with the independent variable being the number of political actors 
responsible (one versus three) and the dependent variable being the 
sum of political responsibility assigned by the participants.69 This 
analysis revealed a significant effect, F(1, 101) = 7.35, p < .01, showing 
that in situations in which political responsibility was assigned 
exclusively to one political actor, participants held this actor to a 
higher level of accountability (mean = 65.00%, std. dev. = 14.74), than 
when responsibilities were divided over three political actors (mean = 
53.30%, std. dev. = 17.06). 
The loss in the total sum of political accountability that occurs 
when responsibility is shared may explain why politicians engaged in 
a blame game following Katrina—the blame game exacerbates this 
 
 68. Participants were 103 male and female law students at Ghent University, between ages 
nineteen and twenty-nine (mean = 21.26%, std. dev. = 1.59). Of course, this age range 
undermines the external validity of this draft study. The age of the participants does not reflect 
the mean voting age in the United States. Also, cross-cultural differences may appear when 
running the study with American citizens rather than Belgian law students. 




                  ·       = mean percentage, 
 
where Xi is the responsibility of government i for causing the flood, measured on a ten point 
Likert scale. When only one actor was responsible, the ten point Likert scale was transformed 
into percentages. 
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loss. Accordingly, finger-pointing is an attractive strategy for 
individual politicians and politicians as a group because it reduces the 
total political costs of government failings. 
B. Cognitive Bias and the Demand for Disaster Management 
Apart from the loss in total political accountability resulting from 
shared responsibility among government actors, recent literature on 
cognitive behavior suggests that voters’ cognitive bias reduces their 
demand for disaster preparation and mitigation policies. 
In the economic literature, voters are assumed to be myopic and 
they tend to discount future value in favor of immediate benefits.70 
Researchers discovered that individuals have difficulty translating 
remote risks into their decisions. As a result, the public perception of 
remote risks often deviates substantially from what experts regard as 
the statistically accurate risk.71 Furthermore, individuals rarely seek 
out probability estimates, unless they have a clear reference point or 
context in which to evaluate the likelihood of an event occurring.72 
Accordingly, “[p]eople may have difficulty gauging how concerned to 
feel about a 1 in 100,000 probability of death without some 
comparison points. Most people just do not know whether 1 in 
100,000 is a large risk or a small risk.”73 
Inhabitants of disaster-prone regions may discount remote risks 
even more than inhabitants of areas where disasters are infrequent. 
This stems from location-specific investments like relationships, 
professional life, and material possessions. Contemplating the risk of 
natural disaster is disconcerting. The theory of cognitive dissonance 
teaches that people tend to reject information that creates internal 
 
 70. For an overview of the literature on time inconsistencies of voters, see generally Susan 
C. Stokes, Public Opinion and Market Reforms: The Limits of Economic Voting, 29 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 499 (1996). 
 71. On the conflation of the terms uncertainty and risk, see James E. Krier, Risk 
Assessment, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 
48, at 347. 
 72. Amos Tversky et al., Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice, 95 PSYCHOL. REV. 
371, 383 (1988); see also Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for 
Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 247, 247 (1996); Howard 
Kunreuther et al., Making Low Probabilities Useful, 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 103, 104 
(2001). 
 73. HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, RISK ANALYSIS FOR 
EXTREME EVENTS: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR REDUCING FUTURE LOSSES 30 (2004), 
http://www.bfrl.nist.gov/oae/publications/gcrs/04871.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2006). 
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conflict in their lives.74 Therefore, citizens in disaster-prone areas may 
discount the likelihood and potential impact of a hurricane or 
earthquake. As a result, many individuals will not consider the 
consequences of low probability events; instead, they treat such 
events as having a zero chance of occurring. Consequently, they may 
not demand loss mitigation strategies because they prefer not to think 
about the consequences of a natural disaster in the region—the “it 
will not happen to me” effect.75 
Individuals may also be disinterested in ex ante disaster planning 
because the benefits of such planning are reduced disproportionately 
by the remote possibility of the benefits ever being realized. This had 
led some to conclude that “low probabilities are inherently ineffective 
in eliciting reactions.”76 
Although a particular disaster preparation policy might be 
advisable from a cost-benefit perspective, voters who discount the 
value of the benefits may lead politicians to forego such investments. 
But the gap between the public’s perception of risk and the 
statistically correct estimate of the risk may also point in the other 
direction.77 That is, even though individuals often ignore risk and treat 
low probability events as if the probability is zero,78 other times they 
 
 74. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & W.T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of 
Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 309 (1982) (“[P]ersons who have made decisions 
tend to discard information that would suggest such decisions are in error because the cognition 
that the decision might be in error is in conflict with the cognition that ego is a smart person.”). 
 75. See George Lowenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 280 (2001) 
(“[A]dolescents either do not consider some potentially harmful consequences of risky behavior 
or underestimate the likelihood of these consequences happening to them.”). 
 76. KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 73, at 29. Even when data is presented to 
respondents, they elect not to use the information. See id. at 32 (“Uncertainty-avoiders who 
have the tendency to avoid negative emotions need not buy more protection but may prefer to 
avoid thinking about the need for protection and hence end up buying less.”); Wesley A. Magat 
et al., Risk-Dollar Tradeoffs, Risk Perceptions, and Consumer Behavior, in LEARNING ABOUT 
RISK 82 (W. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat eds., 1987); Colin F. Camerer & Howard 
Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. ANALYSIS 
& MGMT. 565, 566 (1989) (“[P]ublic perceptions are often unrealistic.”). 
 77. See Paul Slovic et al., Regulation of Risk: A Psychological Perspective, in REGULATORY 
POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 241, 262 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985) (“Why, for example, do 
some communities react vigorously against the location of a liquid-natural-gas terminal in their 
vicinity, despite the assurances of experts that it is safe?”). 
 78. See HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC 
POLICY LESSONS 244 (1978) (“Our results strongly suggest that the consumer is the source of 
market failure. It thus may be necessary to substitute other institutional mechanisms for the free 
market if individuals are to be protected against the consequences of low probability high loss 
events.”). 
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will exaggerate the significance of low probability risks.79 Probability 
perceptions are influenced by how easily events can be brought to an 
individual’s attention—they rely on what is publicly available.80 
Accordingly, the massive media attention accompanying national 
disasters likely inflates individuals’ perceptions of risk. Thus, 
disproportionate weight is given to salient, memorable, or vivid 
evidence.81 
The probability estimate of the likelihood and impact of a 
natural disaster is likely exaggerated after a hurricane or earthquake 
occurs. As a result, voters may believe that a future disaster is more 
probable than the statistically correct estimate warrants.82 
Although the public may not be concerned with preparation 
before a disaster, it will pay close attention once a natural disaster 
occurs. Politicians will then be subject to close scrutiny, especially if it 
appears as if they did not anticipate the event adequately. Some 
scholars maintain that the appropriate policy approach is for 
politicians to ignore their constituents’ preferences when they are 
based on statistically incorrect assessments of risks.83 Although the 
public’s exaggerated response is anticipated in statutes insulating 
governments from liability for flawed disaster management,84 
 
 79. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 281 (1979) (“[V]ery low probabilities are generally 
overweighted . . . .”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 457 (1981) (“There are situations, however, in which the 
outcomes of an act affect the balance in an account that was previously set up by a related 
act.”). 
 80. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127 (1974) (“There are situations in which people assess the frequency of 
a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be 
brought to mind.”). 
 81. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 228 (1973) (“[D]ramatic and salient event[s] . . . 
are likely to be more memorable and easier to recall . . . .”). 
 82. For instance, whenever a disaster occurs voters might switch from an ex ante 
preference for policies conducted on (discounted) cost-benefit analysis in favor of an ex ante 
preference in favor of policies that operate on the basis of the precautionary principle 
(according to which action should be guided by worst case scenarios). 
 83. Other commentators argue that the public often knows best about risk. See generally 
Clayton P. Gilette & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027 
(1990). 
 84. For an overview of statutory protection against governmental negligence liability in 
disaster management, see generally Lerner, supra note 2, at 336–40. Such immunity usually 
pertains to emergency planning, procurement of supplies for emergency preparedness, training 
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politicians have no such immunity at the polls. A politician concerned 
with getting reelected must contend with the political consequences 
of voters who may overreact to disaster relief failures. 
Although voters’ disinterest in disaster preparation may not 
discipline politicians before a disaster, their exaggerated interest after 
a disaster may cause politicians to adopt sound disaster management 
policies as to future disasters. An empirical verification of this 
proposition is beyond the scope of this Article. Note two caveats, 
however. First, if politicians will be held responsible (i.e., get voted 
out of office) for the suffering after a natural disaster, regardless of 
how much precautionary planning they did,85 politicians may lack the 
incentive to plan in the first place. Second, the public’s heightened 
sensitivity to disaster preparedness after a disaster may be short-lived. 
As a result, the political accountability costs of inadequate 
preparation may be limited. In this regard, politicians may be able to 
disregard voters’ heightened demand, unless a disaster precedes an 
election by a short enough time span so that the politician will be held 
fully accountable. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has focused on the underlying causes of the alleged 
deficiency of national disaster planning. I have argued that such 
failings can be explained by the shared political accountability in 
national disaster management. Because the public views the 
responsibility for national disasters as shared among the different 
levels of government, the decisions of one political actor affect the 
standing of other political actors. Using the concept of horizontal 
political externalities among government actors, I argued that 
investments in disaster preparation and ex post relief have different 
effects on political accountability. Additional research on the effect of 
political externalities will be needed to answer many of the questions 
I have raised. In particular, the empirical validity of the role of 
horizontal political externalities awaits testing. Surveys, such as the 
tentative experimental design in Part II.A, could measure whether 
action by one level of government has a positive (or negative) impact 
on other levels of government that were not involved in the action. 
 
of personnel, sheltering, evacuations, emergency transportation, supply of rescue and medical 
services, emergency police and fire services, public utility service, etc. Id. at 336–37. 
 85. Id. at 333 (“As disaster is, by definition, a situation beyond control.”). 
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Studies of this type could manipulate various variables that may 
influence the public’s perception of shared accountability, e.g., the 
allocation of responsibilities, types of media coverage, and finger-
pointing among politicians. Many of these issues can also be 
addressed by using existing field data on elections and approval 
ratings. For example, correlation studies might trace the effects of 
decisionmaking by one level of government on the election results of 
other levels. Existing studies in political science, which evaluate 
congressional election results in relation to presidential performance, 
may be useful for this purpose. 
Furthermore, I suggested that shared political responsibilities 
may reduce overall political accountability. As a result of shared 
political accountability various governmental bodies look to one 
another and engage in a blame game that blurs the public perception 
of political accountability. The tentative experiment in Part II.A 
seemed to confirm this hypothesis, but, as with any pilot study, it 
lacked the methodological rigor to provide robust support for the 
suggested effect of shared accountability and political deadweight 
losses. Also, the blame game might actually bring attention to 
political failures that might not otherwise have received as much 
attention. If so, the blame game is a dominant strategy for politicians 
only when one politician defects, i.e., one politician starts pointing 
fingers. Assuming that the blame game brings more attention than 
would otherwise exist, it would be useful to explore the conditions 
under which a politician would defect. 
Although horizontal political externalities may only be a partial 
explanation for disaster management failures, they provide an 
interesting inroad for further research. In order to address the many 
government failings exposed by Hurricane Katrina, an improved 
understanding of the inner workings of disaster management policy 
seems essential. 
